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Abstract: Recently, JT Turner has argued that proponents oftemporally-extended models of purgatory (henceforth, temps) arecommitted to denying the doctrine of the parousia. Such personstypically argue that temporally-extended models of purgatory areneeded to prevent the possibility that a morally imperfect human mightbecome morally perfect too abruptly. In this article, I argue that Turneris mistaken and that by invoking hypertime and a clarification of thesort of abruptness at issue, temps can affirm both purgatory and thedoctrine of the parousia.After clarifying the nature of hypertime, I then present a non-temporal model of purgatory. This model permits those uncomfortablewith endorsing the metaphysical possibility of hypertime tonevertheless affirm the key intuition motivating temporally-extendedmodels (i.e. that they are necessary to avoid too abrupt a change incharacter) without rejecting the doctrine of the parousia.
1. IntroductionIn some of his recent work, Turner (2017) employs the doctrine of the Parousia toargue against a temporally extended doctrine of Purgatory. According to proponentsof temporally extended purgatory (e.g., Jerry Walls1), given the sort of creatures weare, for any human person, A, if that person’s moral character is abruptly changed,then A ceases to exist (i.e., roughly, with some new, though remarkably similar,person A* coming to exist in place of A).According to Turner, however, Christian doctrine includes a commitment to apre-ordained and precisely determined temporal location for the Parousia, an eventwhich he argues if actual entails that some humans undergo abrupt change in moralcharacter without ceasing to exist (Turner 2017, 197). Thus, the upshot of Turner’sargument is that proponents of a temporally extended model of purgatory must
1 See Walls’s defense of a Protestant doctrine of Purgatory in: (i) (Walls 2012); (ii) (Walls 2015); (iii)(Barnard 2007) seems to presuppose the temporally extended model, as does (Green 2015). For ahelpful discussion about the possible purposes for purgatory, see especially (Judisch 2009).
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either (i) reject the scriptural doctrine2 of the Parousia or (ii) reject their intuitionsthat human character cannot be changed abruptly (and thereby undercut afundamental motivation for adopting a doctrine of purgatory3).I argue that proponents of a temporally extended purgatory should hold thewall against Turner’s advance. More specifically, I argue that Turner’s case rests on aparticular understanding of abruptness that is inessential to any doctrine oftemporally extended purgatory. Thus, if the proponent of a temporally extendedmodel of purgatory rejects Turner’s understanding of abruptness, her purgatorialmodel escapes Turner’s objection unscathed.I proceed as follows. First in §1, I present Turner’s argument againsttemporally extended purgatory, highlighting the crucial premise concerningabruptness and moral character. Then in §2, I define the sense of abruptness neededto make the crucial premise true, followed by a disambiguation of the senses ofabruptness at issue. I follow this, in §3, with a discussion of the concept of hypertimewhich allows us to see more clearly why Turner’s understanding of abruptness isinadequate. Then finally in §4, I offer an alternative version of purgatory that does notdepend on temporal extension at all. This last alternative account of purgatory isintended to serve as a fallback position for anyone with misgivings concerning themetaphysical possibility of hypertime but for whom the intuitions concerning theimplausibility of abrupt change in moral character remain compelling.
2. Abruptness and the ParousiaAs Turner represents the argument for a temporally extended purgatory, it rests onthe following crucial premise:
(Crucial Premise) It’s not possible to affect an abrupt transition frommorally imperfect to morally perfect character states in essentiallytemporal beings (Turner 2017, 198-199).4
2 I say “scriptural doctrine” since the defense Turner offers in his paper is based on a prior commitmentto a normative understanding of the teachings of certain biblical passages, such as most notably 1Corinthians 15:51-52, which reads: “Behold! I tell you a mystery. We shall not all sleep, but we shall allbe changed, in a moment in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound,and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we shall be changed” (quoted on (Turner 2017, 207).For the interested reader, see (Abraham 1981) for helpful discussion concerning the nature ofscriptural authority.3 This is not the only motivation, as an anonymous reviewer has pointed out, since another motivationmight be to avoid divine culpability for the actions of lapsable humans. See (Barnard 2007) for thissuggestion.4 I’ve expanded the original premise slightly, but only to help those who have not read Turner’s paperto understand the content. Moreover, the argument can be made quickly from the Crucial Premise (i.e.,the claim that no human being is morally perfect at death) and the claim that moral perfection isneeded for residence in the new heavens and new earth to the conclusion that some sort of non-abrupttransitional state, such as a temporally extended purgatory, is a necessary condition for entrance toheavenly bliss.
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However, the Crucial Premise is in direct conflict with the conclusion of the
Abrupt Purgation argument Turner advances. That argument proceeds as follows:1. Essential to the definition of Heaven is that human beings are in astate of complete moral perfection. (From TAP [i.e. the argument fora temporally extended purgatory])2. Christ’s parousia (return) marks the consummation of NewCreation, a cosmos for which its inhabitants must be fit for Heaven.3. So, those human beings who inhabit the New Creation must becompletely morally perfect. (1, 2)4. Christ’s parousia (return) is at some fixed time in the future. (Axiomof orthodox Christian theology)5. So, at some fixed time in the future, those human beings who inhabitthe New Creation must be completely morally perfect. (3, 4)6. During the second before Christ returns, there will be MIHs [i.e.morally imperfect humans] living on earth that, upon Christ’s
parousia, instantaneously inhabit the New Creation. (e.g., 1 Cor.15:51-52)7. So, the MIHs living on earth during the second before Christ returnsinstantaneously will be made completely morally perfect at the timeof Christ’s parousia. (from 5, 6; and 1 Cor. 15:51-52)8. If an event E will happen, it’s possible that it will happen.9. Therefore, it’s possible that MIHs instantaneously will be madecompletely morally perfect. (from 7, 8)5This argument purports to show that no one can hold to a temporally extendedmodel of purgatory while simultaneously affirming the doctrine of the parousia. Inother words, Turner seems to think that anyone who affirms the argument’sconclusion—i.e. that it’s possible for MIHs to be made morally perfectinstantaneously—is committed to denying the Crucial Premise of the argument for atemporally extended purgatory (Turner 2017, 202). However contrary toappearances, Turner’s claim does not immediately follow.
3. Two Senses of AbruptnessLet us refer to the conclusion of Turner’s argument as the Parousian Premise. Thereason that Turner’s claim is mistaken is that an inference from the Parousian Premiseto a rejection of the Crucial Premise requires that it be impossible to have an abruptchange that is not-immediate. Of course, it certainly seems reasonable to affirm thatsomething happens abruptly only if it is immediate. However, there are at least twodifferent ways of understanding abruptness and its relation to immediacy, one ofwhich prohibits making the above inference.
5 (Ibid., 201-202).
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Abruptness1 – for any person, P, a change in P’s moral character will beabrupt1 iff along the same dimension of time, P has moral character Mat t0 and moral character N at t1, where t0 and t1 are separated by a meresecond & (M ≠ N).6Now, while looking at this definition of abruptness, notice the locution ‘alongthe same dimension of time’. This qualifier is important since even if some persontravels along an alternative temporal dimension for some amount of time sufficientfor their character to develop gradually (i.e., when counting the number of secondsthey travel in total across all temporal dimensions), this definition would still counttheir change in character as abrupt were they to return to the dimension of time inwhich they began. This feature of abruptness1 will become clearer below, but firstconsider an alternative construal of abruptness that avoids the shortcoming found inthe previous definition:Abruptness2 - for any person, P, a change in P’s moral character will beabrupt2 iff along the same dimension of time, P has moral character Mat t0 and moral character N at t1, where t0 and t1 are separated by a meresecond, (M ≠ N), and it is not the case that P’s change from M to N took
place along at least one alternative dimension of time.According to Abruptness2, someone can undergo change in character thatwould count as abrupt1 without counting as abrupt2. The way this would occur mightbe, as suggested earlier, by a person traveling along an alternative temporaldimension without a trace of this travel being discerned from the perspective of anyother person residing within the usual (or initial) temporal dimension. In otherwords, abruptness2 leaves open the possibility of hypertime7, and althoughhypertime is not itself a commonsense notion8, it provides a way for the defender ofthe Crucial Premise to avoid Turner’s criticisms while honoring the gradual change inmoral character motivating their temporally extended model of purgatory.Let us see, then, whether someone might consistently hold both the Parousian
Premise and the Crucial Premise by utilizing both interpretations of abruptness (i.e.,Abruptness1 or Abruptness2). For the reader’s sake, here are both premises again (i.e.,with ‘instantaneously’ replaced by ‘abruptly’, ‘completely’ deleted, and the syntaxrearranged to accommodate the changes in the Parousian Premise):
(Parousian Premise) It’s possible that morally imperfect humans will bemade morally perfect abruptly.
6 Following Turner, I’ll assume that everyone is happy to count by seconds and that whether time isdiscrete or continuous is irrelevant to the question of whether a second is a sufficiently small amountof time to give rise to the abrupt-change-in-character problem we’re considering.7 See, for instance, the fascinating and creative work of Hud Hudson on this and related issues: (i)(Hudson 2005) & (ii) (Hudson 2014).8 Indeed, it needs some thorough explaining, which will arrive presently.
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(Crucial Premise) It’s not possible to affect an abrupt transition frommorally imperfect to morally perfect character states in essentiallytemporal beings.So, which version of abruptness (i.e., Abruptness1 or Abruptness2) is at playfor the two above premises? It seems that someone might affirm the Parousian
Premise by interpreting it according to Abruptness1. That is, they would agree that the
parousia happens at a particular instant in time along the temporal dimension onwhich people normally travel, and that from the perspective of someone along onlythat dimension of time, a change in moral character for some individual wouldcertainly be abrupt1. However, if the story I suggested earlier about the possibility oftraveling along alternative temporal dimensions is indeed possible, then someonemight reasonably reject the Parousian Premise when interpreted in light ofAbruptness2.But then, how about the Crucial Premise? Just the opposite would happen forthe sort of person I have in mind. Interpreted in light of Abruptness1, the proponentof temporally extended models of purgatory need not accept the argument from the
Crucial Premise. Such a person would claim that surely such an abrupt transition is
possible, so long as the way in which the transition along a single temporal dimensionis brought about is from a detour along an alternative temporal dimension. But then,were the same person to interpret the Crucial Premise in light of Abruptness2, theywould undoubtedly affirm the Crucial Premise.Thus, the only way in which an affirmation of the Crucial Premise wouldcommit someone to denying the Parousian Premise is if the same notion of abruptnessprovides the best interpretation of those respective premises. However, if thehypertime scenario I have suggested works, then this is mistaken. Rather, someoneshould interpret the Parousian Premise in light of Abruptness1 and the Crucial Premisein light of Abruptness2, such that both can be consistently affirmed.
4. Modeling HypertimeGiven our two understandings of abruptness, a word of explanation concerninghypertime is in order. What precisely is a hypertime? How might someone conceiveof an individual who jumped temporal dimensions? Let us turn to these questionsnow. First, let us consider a basic construal of spacetime. One way of imagining ouruniverse is as one composed of three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension,such that over time (and with one spatial dimension suppressed for ease ofdemonstration) the entire universe can be represented as a spatiotemporal blockcomposed of rectangular sections pressed together much like the pages of a book.Moreover, each of these pages represents the entirety of space (i.e. all three spatialdimensions) as it is at a particular instant of time. And lastly, just as one reads a book
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with a clear beginning to the story as well as a close, so too does our spacetime blockhave a direction built-in (i.e. the arrow of time).9Now, to posit a hypertime is to simply posit an additional temporal dimension,just as to posit a hyperspace would be to posit an additional spatial dimension.However, although we have direct experience concerning how multiple spatialdimensions might be combined (e.g. as when we form a cube out of a series offlattened squares), combining temporal dimensions is not a common mental practiceamong humans.10 This need not prevent us from imagining scenarios involvingadditional temporal dimensions, however, for there are ways of conceiving of howthey might interact that does not require us to combine them altogether in quite theway that we do spatial dimensions.First, let us assume that human psychology is such that it can only functionwell when experiencing one temporal dimension at a time. Thus, were a human beingto somehow reside on multiple temporal dimensions, they would be unable toprocess the flow of times.11 Second, let us suppose that it is uncontroversial that Godcould somehow preserve the physical matter composing an individual human suchthat they could travel along some dimension of time (or another) without reflectingthe aging process in their physical constitution. And third, suppose that it is possiblefor God to move an individual from one three-dimensional space to another withoutsuch a move threatening the continued existence of the individual in question.12 Withthese assumptions in play, consider the following possibility.Bethany awoke at 7:30 A.M. in a panic when she realized that she hadto be at a meeting by 8:00 A.M (i.e. leaving her only 30 minutes to getready). In a rush, Bethany took just 15 minutes to get completelydressed and 10 minutes to cook and eat breakfast. With 5 minutes untilthe meeting would begin, and precisely a 5 minute walk to get there, itappeared as if she would be able to make her meeting after all. But alas,she realized at the last minute that her elixir of life, a fresh cup of Frenchpress coffee, would itself take 5 minutes to prepare and at least another10 minutes to drink! Knowing that diverging from her ritual of afreshly-ground blonde roast would spell inescapable disaster for hermeeting, she began to lament. But the very instant she began to lament,she was whisked away into a new temporal dimension (i.e. a temporaldimension coupled with an alternative three-dimensional space within
9 See (Mullins 2016) for a way of spelling out the eternalist picture in the four-dimensional way I offerhere. For an accessible yet more technical introduction to the theoretical notion of spacetime as I’mthinking of it, see (Disalle 2016).10 Perhaps it is more common than I suspect, but for myself, at least, I don’t think about such thingsregularly. The following papers come from members of this minority group of multiple-temporal-dimension thinkers: (i) (MacBeath 1993); (ii) (Meiland 1974); (iii) (Wilkerson 1973); & (iv)(Wilkerson 1979).11 But see (Thompson 1965) for a brilliant example that calls this assumption into question. Theassumption is not essential to the point I’m making, but it simplifies the case significantly.12 For instance, one might suppose that there are simply two different three-dimensional spacetimesthat can be traveled between via a fourth spatial dimension, but then, we can stipulate that such fourdimensional space travel is possible only when done via divine guidance.
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which Bethany might work). More specifically, as it turns out, asupreme being took her to a unidirectional temporal dimension,complete with a French press, coffee grinder, hot water kettle, and herfavorite blonde roast.13 Immediately, the supreme being sent amessenger to explain the situation to Bethany; namely, that this was aresult of her prayers being heard and that upon completion of hercoffee ritual, she would be returned to her original spatiotemporaldimension without her physical body reflecting any temporal aging dueto the time spent in this alternative dimension of time.14 In fullunderstanding and admirable calmness given the strangeness of thesituation, Bethany proceeded through her coffee ritual producing anabsolutely flawless cup of coffee. Upon completion of her last sip, witha sigh of contentment, Bethany was returned to her original dimensionof time and location, and immediately she set out to make her meetingat 8:00 A.M.The above story provides a straightforward way in which God might utilizealternative temporal dimensions to bring about certain aims. Moreover, if we canconceive of such a scenario coherently for Bethany as she makes and consumes a cupof coffee over a period of 15 minutes, then we can surely conceive of a temporallyextended model of purgatory that functions in much the same way. For example, atone second prior to the parousia, God places all the morally imperfect humansresiding on earth within a new timeline (and perhaps within an additional spatialdimension). He also preserves, let’s say, their physical bodies in such a way that uponcompleting their purgatorial phase (and let us assume he knows they will completesuch a phase in a finite amount of time) they are returned to the timeline along whichthe parousia is to take place fully intact. Upon returning to the timeline, they are nolonger morally imperfect, and thus, they are fit to enter into the new heavens and newearth alongside their fellow saints. Thus, it is possible for a proponent of temporallyextended models of purgatory to affirm both the Crucial Premise and the Parousian
Premise.15
13 And let us not forget that Bethany’s coffee preparation is a ritual, such that the very performing ofthe ritual is part of what helps her to avoid disaster later in a day.14 In dialogue, JT Turner brought up the possibility that certain changes in character plausiblysupervene on certain somatic changes in a person. For anyone with worries about this, let us stipulatethat the divine being can return an individual to her original temporal dimension with her physicalbody unchanged with respect to aging except for bodily changes that would be required for the changein character involved in purgatory. It seems like this could be managed easily enough in such a waythat the model doesn’t posit any strong commitment to an extreme substance dualism. Indeed, I’d liketo think that the model is neutral between physicalism and dualist views about human persons.15 An anonymous reviewer emphasized that on this hypertime model of purgatory, thephenomenological component of the “twinkling of an eye” from 1 Corinthians 15:52 is perhaps notpresent for someone who returns to the original timeline from an alternative temporal dimension.There are interpretive issues with this text that might be relevant, but since I am working on theassumptions that I find in JT Turner’s account, I can say two things. First, the non-temporal modelsoffered in §4 avoid this issue. Second, it is unclear to which phenomenological perspective Paul isspeaking (if indeed he is speaking to a phenomenological perspective). Is it how the Corinthians would
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5. Temporal Experience Models: A Non-Temporal
AlternativeThe plausibility of hypertime is not uncontroversial.16 Indeed, many proponents ofpurgatory may be disinclined to adopt such a model of the doctrine. However, ifsomeone rejects the metaphysical possibility of hypertime, they cannot, I think,escape Turner’s objection while maintaining a temporally extended model ofpurgatory.But there is no need to maintain a temporally extended model of purgatory inthe first place. Even given the need for a gradual transition in moral character, onecan make use of a familiar distinction between the passage of time and the subjectiveexperience of time to preserve a more modest version of purgatory. Thus, eventhough Turner’s argument may undermine temporal models of purgatory (assuminghypertime is metaphysically impossible), it cannot undermine all models ofpurgatory.Consider an experience shared by anyone who has driven down a longhighway; namely, the phenomenon of one’s brain switching on autopilot. Sometimeswe arrive at a destination or travel many miles before we realize that we cannot recallany of the geography or possible obstacles we have clearly avoided. Indeed, it willseem to us as if only a few minutes have passed whereas in reality an hour has eludedus. That is, our conscious awareness of the passage of time—i.e. our experience of thepassage of time—does not match the actual passage of time.Another example of this phenomenon might be found if we consider luciddreaming.17 Lucid dreams are dreams in which the dreamer is aware that she isdreaming, and in some cases the dreamer may also be able to control the dream invarious ways. Importantly, lucid dreamers commonly claim that a lengthy period oftime has passed in their dream when a much shorter time has passed in reality.18Whatever we want to say about the nature of these types of dreams, it is evident thatthere is a strict distinction between one’s subjective experience of the passage of time(while in the dream state) and the actual passage of time (outside of the dream state).
perceive the parousia from some 3rd person perspective? Is it the perspective of the individualsinvolved in the parousia? Is it really just an indicator of how fast the change will be? I’m not sure, andI suspect the text underdetermines this.16 (Thompson 1965) argues that communication would be impossible between two persons residingon different but connected temporal dimensions, and thus, that we cannot gain evidence of multipletemporal dimensions. Other examples of those who oppose the idea of more than one temporaldimension are (Swinburne 1968) and (Quinton 1993).17 (Voss et al 2009). An anonymous reviewer has also suggested that one’s “experience of being undergeneral anesthesia” provides another possible example of my point. That seems right, although I donot have any personal experience with such a post-anesthesia awakening.18 Some lucid dreamers claim that they can even change the subjective experience of the dream’stemporal duration when some sort of pre-sleep agreement is made that they will perform that actionin the lucid dream: (LaBerge et al 1986, 258).
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Now, what kind of gradual transition from one moral character to another isnecessary to satisfy the concerns of the proponents of temporally extended models ofPurgatory? Must the gradual transition be measured in actual physical time, or couldone’s subjective experience of the passage of time suffice?Suppose we think that the subjective experience of the passage of time can besufficient to prevent change in moral character from counting as abrupt. Indeed, solong as the amount of time passing from the subject’s point of view matches whateveramount of objective time is necessary to avoid the charge of abruptness, then thisconjecture appears reasonable. If so, however, then no model of Purgatory wouldrequire adherence to a temporally extended purgatory, but rather, an apparentlytemporally extended purgatory (i.e. from the subject’s point of view).19 Thus, even ifsomeone rejects the metaphysical possibility of hypertime (the possibility of which Isimply assume above) they can still offer a model of purgatory that honors theintuition that a change in moral character cannot be abrupt without being forced toalso reject the doctrine of the parousia. In other words, for anyone seeking to put anend to arguments defending an intermediate state of human existence prior to entryinto the new heavens and new earth (e.g. some form of purgatory), much more mustbe said.20
6. ConclusionI have argued that commitment to the orthodox doctrine of the parousia does notentail a rejection of temporally extended models of purgatory; that is, due to thepossibility of additional temporal dimensions that would prevent a change in themoral character of some human persons from being too abrupt. I have also suggesteda way to develop a model of purgatory, one based on the subjective experience oftemporal passage, which allows anyone motivated to preserve the intuition that achange in moral character cannot be too abrupt (without destroying the personundergoing such a change) to maintain a commitment to Purgatory withoutcommitting to the metaphysical possibility of hypertime or running afoul of Turner’s
parousia argument. Consequently, it seems that those developing models ofPurgatory, both temporal and non-temporal, need not be concerned with thepossibility of denying the doctrine of the parousia. Both can be maintained withoutfear of incoherence.
19 An anonymous reviewer raised a worry about the possibility that the apparentness of the experiencemight raise worries of divine deception. I take it, however, that one could be aware, as in the luciddreaming case, that the actual flow of time and one’s experience of the flow of time are distinct suchthat there is no deception involved. So I think the objection can be avoided.20 Turner might find the subjective temporal experience model of purgatory unproblematic, though it’sunclear. In (Turner 2017, fn 6), he notes that he agrees with Walls that some form of purgatory isneeded, although the desire for temporal extension is unwarranted. I suspect other aspects of mytemporal experience model, however, may give Turner pause.
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